U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement

September 29, 2021Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Section 1.Pittsburgh Statement

1. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) met for the first time in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2021.It was co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, European Commission Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager, European Commission Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis. The United States and the European Union reaffirm the TTC’s objectives to: coordinate approaches to key global technology, economic, and trade issues; and to deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations, basing policies on shared democratic values.
2. We support the continued growth of the U.S.-EU technology, economic and trade relationship and cooperation in addressing global challenges. We intend to collaborate to promote shared economic growth that benefits workers on both sides of the Atlantic, grow the transatlantic trade and investment relationship, fight the climate crisis, protect the environment, promote workers’ rights, combat child and forced labor, expand resilient and sustainable supply chains, and expand cooperation on critical and emerging technologies. We stand together in continuing to protect our businesses, consumers, and workers from unfair trade practices, in particular those posed by non-market economies, that are undermining the world trading system.
3. We share a strong desire to drive the digital transformation that spurs trade and investment, benefits workers, protects the environment and climate, strengthens our technological and industrial leadership, sets high standards globally, boosts innovation, and protects and promotes critical and emerging technologies and infrastructure. We intend to cooperate on the development and deployment of new technologies in ways that reinforce our shared democratic values, including respect for universal human rights, advance our respective efforts to address the climate change crisis, and encourage compatible standards and regulations. We intend to cooperate to effectively address the misuse of technology, to protect our societies from information manipulation and interference, promote secure and sustainable international digital connectivity, and support human rights defenders.
4. We seek inclusive economic growth that benefits all of our people, and intend to make a particular focus on inclusive growth for middle class and lower income people on both sides of the Atlantic. We also have a particular focus on opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises.
5. The cooperation and exchanges of the TTC are without prejudice to the regulatory autonomy of the United States and the European Union and should respect the different legal systems in both jurisdictions. Cooperation within the TTC is intended to feed into coordination in multilateral bodies, including in the WTO, and wider efforts with like-minded partners, with the aim of promoting democratic and sustainable models of digital and economic governance.
6. To strengthen our cooperation, we identified the following areas of joint work over the coming months, with the intent of achieving concrete outcomes on these issues by the time of our next meeting.

Section 2.Pittsburgh outcomes

1. As a demonstration of our shared commitment to make progress on the objectives of the TTC, the United States and European Union have identified the following outcomes in specific areas, the details of which are further reflected in Annexes I-V.

1. We acknowledge the importance of and share a commitment to consulting closely with diverse stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic as we undertake our work in the TTC.Robust engagement with business, thought leaders, labor organizations, non-profit organizations, environmental constituencies, academics, and other stakeholders that form the civil society at large is essential to this work. We intend to separately make available points of contact, where stakeholders may submit their inputs, comments and views. Moreover, regular exchanges with the stakeholders are to be organized through diverse channels, both at the level of working groups and political principals, as well as by each of the respective parties or jointly. This is to encourage the transatlantic stakeholder community to provide common proposals on the work pursued by the TTC.

Section 3.Future scope of work

The United States and the European Union ask that each of the working groups established under the TTC carry forward important work to strengthen our relationship and cooperation. Specifically, we ask that the working groups, by our next meeting, focus on the following:

Annex I

Statement on Investment Screening

1. The United States and the European Union believe that openness to foreign investment is essential for economic growth and innovation. They take note of the very significant volume of investments, exceeding four trillion euros / dollars linking companies on both sides of the Atlantic, which illustrates the strength of the transatlantic partnership.
2. The United States and the European Union intend to continue to protect themselves from risk arising from certain foreign investment through investment screening focused on addressing risks to national security and, within the European Union, public order as well.
3. The United States and the European Union recognize that investment screening regimes should be based on legislative or regulatory frameworks accompanied by the appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
4. Furthermore, drawing on best practices, investment screening regimes should be guided by the principles of non-discrimination, transparency of policies and predictability of outcomes, proportionality of measures, and accountability of implementing authorities, as set forth in the Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security, adopted by the OECD Council in May 2009
5. The United States and the European Union envisage to meet periodically, through the TTC Investment Screening Working Group and other appropriate channels, to exchange information on investment trends and best practices related to effective investment screening implemented in line with the above principles, while respecting confidentiality limitations. In particular, the United States and the European Union intend to explore the following work-streams:

1. The United States and the European Union also intend to maintain lines of communication with stakeholders on these issues and engage with other partners globally on investment screening.
2. The working group intends to conduct a joint virtual outreach event for stakeholders.

Annex II

Statement on Export Control Cooperation

Principles

1. The United States and the European Union recognize the importance of effective controls on trade in dual-use items, including transfers in sensitive technologies. Such controls are necessary to ensure compliance with our international obligations and commitments, in particular regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons, regional peace, security, stability and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as our joint security and foreign policy interests.
2. The United States and European Union understand that a multilateral approach to export controls is most effective for protecting international security and supporting a global level-playing field. They reiterate their commitment to working with partners and allies, where appropriate, to coordinate and broaden the global response, promoting a multilateral rules-based trade and security system founded on transparency, reciprocity, and fairness.
3. The United States and the European Union note that the potential applications of emerging technologies in the defense and security field raise important legal, ethical, and political concerns and recognize the need to address risks associated with the trade in emerging technologies.
4. The United States and European Union share concerns that technology acquisition strategies, including economic coercive measures, and civil-military fusion policies of certain actors undermine security interests, and challenge the objective assessment of risks by the competent authorities and the effective implementation of rules-based controls in line with internationally-agreed standards.
5. The United States and the European Union are of the view that export controls should not unduly disrupt strategic supply chains and should be consistent with the applicable exceptions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United States and the European Union recognize the importance, where appropriate and feasible, of consultations prior to the introduction of controls outside the multilateral regimes, in particular to ensure that the application of export controls is transparent and equitable for U.S. and EU exporters.
6. The United States and European Union acknowledge the need for controls on trade in certain dual-use items, in particular technologies, including cyber-surveillance technologies that may be misused in ways that might lead to serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
7. The United States and European Union also recognize the responsibility of the private sector, as well as public R&D institutions, under export control rules as well as the importance of raising awareness in the private and the research sectors, and that promoting cooperation and self-regulation is integral to effective export controls. They are committed to working closely in partnership with the private sector and public R&D institutions in that regard.
8. Against this backdrop the Export Control Working Group under the Trade and Technology Council, building on the on-going U.S.-EU Export Control Dialogue, provides a dedicated forum enabling the United States and the European Union to enhance cooperation on export controls in order to address evolving security risks and challenges associated with trade in strategic dual-use technologies to destinations warranting greater scrutiny, while ensuring that export controls are consistent with joint innovation and technology development.

Cooperation areasThe United States and the European Union intend to enhance their cooperation in the following areas:

Next StepsTo implement these Principles and initiate the Consultations, the Export Control Working Group is tasked to:

Annex III

Statement on AI

1. The United States and European Union believe that artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have the potential to bring substantial benefit to our citizens, societies and economies.AI can help tackle significant challenges societies face, transform industries, and improve the quality of our lives.
2. The United States and European Union acknowledge that AI-enabled technologies have risks associated with them if they are not developed and deployed responsibly or if they are misused.
3. The United States and European Union affirm their willingness and intention to develop and implement trustworthy AI and their commitment to a human-centered approach that reinforces shared democratic values and respects universal human rights, which they have already demonstrated by endorsing the OECD Recommendation on AI.Moreover, the United States and European Union are founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, which brings together a coalition of like-minded partners seeking to support and guide the responsible development of AI that is grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, economic growth, and societal benefit.
4. The United States and European Union are committed to working together to ensure that AI serves our societies and economies and that it is used in ways consistent with our common democratic values and human rights. Accordingly, the United States and European Union are opposed to uses of AI that do not respect this requirement, such as rights-violating systems of social scoring.
5. The United States and European Union have significant concerns that authoritarian governments are piloting social scoring systems with an aim to implement social control at scale. These systems pose threats to fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, including through silencing speech, punishing peaceful assembly and other expressive activities, and reinforcing arbitrary or unlawful surveillance systems.
6. The United States and European Union underline that policy and regulatory measures should be based on, and proportionate to the risks posed by the different uses of AI.
7. The United States notes the European Commission’s proposal for a risk-based regulatory framework for AI. The framework defines high-risk uses of AI, which are to be subject to a number of requirements. The EU also supports a number of research, innovation and testing projects on trustworthy AI as part of its AI strategy.
8. The European Union notes the U.S. government’s development of an AI Risk Management Framework, as well as ongoing projects on trustworthy AI as part of the U.S. National AI Initiative.
9. We are committed to working together to foster responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI that reflects our shared values and commitment to protecting the rights and dignity of all our citizens. We seek to provide scalable, research-based methods to advance trustworthy approaches to AI that serve all people in responsible, equitable, and beneficial ways.

Areas of cooperationThe United States and the European Union want to translate our common values into tangible action and cooperation for mutual benefit.

Annex IV

Statement on Semiconductor Supply Chains

1. The United States and European Union reaffirm their willingness to build a partnership on the rebalancing of global supply chains in semiconductors with a view to enhancing their respective security of supply as well as respective capacity to design and produce semiconductors, especially, but not limited to, those with leading-edge capabilities. This partnership should be balanced and of equal interest to both sides. It will initially focus on short-term supply chain issues. Cooperation on mid- and long-term strategic semiconductor issues will begin in the relevant TTC working groups ahead of the next TTC Meeting.
2. We acknowledge that semiconductors are the material basis for integrated circuits that are essential to modern-day life and underpin our economies. As such, semiconductors power virtually every sector of the economy, including energy, healthcare, agriculture, consumer electronics, manufacturing, defense, and transportation. They determine the characteristics of the products into which they are embedded, including security, computing power, privacy, trust, energy performance and safety.
3. The COVID-19 pandemic has further increased the importance of semiconductors. They have enabled remote health care, medical research, working and studying from home and electronic commerce. Through the pandemic, shortages of certain semiconductors have highlighted the importance of ensuring stable, resilient and robust supply chains for these vital products.
4. We recognize that the semiconductor supply chain, from raw materials, design and manufacturing to assembly, testing and incorporation into end products, is extremely complex and geographically dispersed. The development and production of semiconductors include multiple countries, with some very concentrated segments. The United States and European Union have some important respective strengths as well as ongoing, significant mutual dependencies, and common external dependencies.
5. We share the view that promoting supply chain transparency, in partnership with industry and all relevant stakeholders, is essential to strengthening investment and addressing the supply and demand imbalance in the semiconductor industry. With the goal of identifying bottlenecks pertaining to supply and demand across the various segments of the semiconductor supply chain, we intend to enhance cooperation on measures to advance transparency and communication in the semiconductor supply chain.To this end, we intend to engage with our respective stakeholders in discussions of relevant measures.
6. In the short-term, we underline the importance of jointly identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, mapping capacity in the semiconductor value chain, and strengthening our domestic semiconductor ecosystems, from, research, design to manufacturing, with a view to improving resilience, through consultation with stakeholders, and the right incentives.

1. We share the aim of avoiding a subsidy race and the risk of crowding out private investments that would themselves contribute to our security and resilience.
2. Without prejudice to cooperation with our likeminded partners, we intend to focus on reducing existing strategic dependencies throughout the supply chain, especially through a diversification of the supply chain and increased investment.
3. We intend to work jointly so that any investment made on our territories is done in full respect of our respective security of supply.

Annex V

Statement on Global Trade Challenges

The United States and the European Union intend to initially focus on the following specific objectives in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group.Trade Policy Cooperation towards Non-Market Economies (NMEs)In paragraph 22 of the Joint Statement issued following their June 15, 2021 summit meeting, President Biden, President Michel, and President von der Leyen stated: “We intend to work cooperatively on efforts to achieve meaningful World Trade Organization (WTO) reform and help promote outcomes that benefit our workers and companies…We intend to seek to update the WTO rulebook with more effective disciplines on industrial subsidies, unfair behavior of state-owned enterprises, and other trade and market distorting practices.” As a complement to this cooperation, the United States and the European Union intend to focus in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group on responding to the challenges posed by non-market economies cited in the June 15 Joint Statement.The United States and the European Union, as democratic market economies, share a number of core values, including with respect to human and labor rights, environmental protection, the rule of law, non-discrimination, regulatory transparency, market-based commerce, and the freedom to innovate and to have innovations protected.We intend to work together in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group to ensure that our trade policies support these and other shared values, including by promoting them internationally and by resisting challenges to these values in global commerce arising from non-market distortive policies and practices.Among the actions the United States and the European Union intend to take in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group with respect to this objective are the following:

1. Share information on non-market distortive policies and practices that pose particular challenges for U.S. and EU workers and businesses, both across sectors and in relation to specific sectors in which we have identified certain risks, with the goal of developing strategies for mitigating or responding to those policies, practices, and challenges. Non-market practices that raise concerns include – but are not limited to – forced technology transfer; state-sponsored theft of intellectual property; market-distorting industrial subsidies, including support given to and through SOEs, and all other types of support offered by governments; the establishment of domestic and international market share targets; discriminatory treatment of foreign companies and their products and services in support of industrial policy objectives; and anti-competitive and non-market actions of SOEs.
2. The United States and the European Union recognize that domestic measures that each takes on its own can play a critical role in ensuring that trade policy supports market-based economies and the rule of law. This recognition is without prejudice to the views that either of them may have with respect to the appropriateness of any particular measure.

To improve the use and effectiveness of such domestic measures, the United States and the European Union intend to:

1. Exchange information on the impact of non-market, distortive policies and practices in third countries and explore ways of working together and with other partners with a view to addressing the negative effects of such policies and practices, which can undermine development goals and have a negative impact on U.S. and EU commerce in those countries.

Avoiding New and Unnecessary Barriers to Trade in New and Emerging TechnologiesThe United States and the European Union recognize and respect the importance of regulation of goods and services to achieve legitimate policy objectives. They are also aware that such regulations may have unintended consequences and result in barriers to trade between them and that such barriers, once implemented, can be challenging to remove. Consequently, the United States and the European Union intend to work to identify and avoid potential new unnecessary barriers to trade in products or services derived from new and emerging tech, while ensuring that legitimate regulatory objectives are achieved.This work will fully respect each side’s regulatory autonomy and regulatory system, and will promote the highest level of openness and transparency and welcome input from all interested stakeholders.Cooperation on Trade and LaborThe United States and the European Union intend to promote together and in an inclusive way the protection of fundamental labor rights, including by combatting the scourge of forced and child labor, with each side using relevant trade policies and tools, including FTAs and unilateral measures, such as preference and other programs, and cooperating in the ILO, WTO, and other appropriate multilateral fora. Both sides intend to promote responsible business conduct, with the aim of enhancing the sustainability of global value chains. In pursuit of these objectives, we intend to:

1. Share information and best practices on trade measures related to the respect for fundamental labor rights and prevention of forced and child labor, including implementation and enforcement; new initiatives of each side, with a view to developing additional and joint ways to prevent forced labor; and the effectiveness of labor enforcement tools, with a view to improving them.
2. Cooperate and jointly support work in multilateral fora to promote fundamental labor rights, including to combat child and forced labor, and including in the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations.
3. Discuss the impact of technology on labor markets, working conditions, and worker rights, including policy issues related to the “gig” economy, worker surveillance, and labor conditions throughout supply chains.
4. Exchange information on the implementation of labor provisions in our respective trade agreements.

Cooperation on Trade-Related Environmental and Climate Policies and MeasuresThe United States and the European Union underline the positive role that trade can play in addressing environmental challenges such as climate change, achieving climate neutrality, and supporting the transition to a more circular economy. The United States and the European Union intend to consult on the inclusion of trade-related climate and environment issues in the work plan of the Global Trade Challenges Working Group.Consultation with StakeholdersThe United States and the European Union welcome input from and dialogue with business, trade unions, consumer organizations, and environmental and other non-government organizations on the work of the Global Trade Challenges Working Group, including joint input from transatlantic groupings of stakeholders.

###